Left Wittgensteinianism by Queloz, Matthieu & Cueni, Damian
Penultimate Draft for
European Journal of Philosophy
Forthcoming
Left Wittgensteinianism
Matthieu Queloz and Damian Cueni
Social and political concepts are indispensable yet historically and culturally variable
in a way that poses a challenge: how can we reconcile confident commitment to them
with awareness of their contingency? In this article, we argue that available responses
to this problem—Foundationalism, Ironism, and Right Wittgensteinianism—are unsat-
isfactory. Instead, we draw on the work of BernardWilliams to tease out and develop a
LeftWittgensteinian response. In present-day pluralistic and historically self-conscious
societies, mere confidence in our concepts is not enough. For modern individuals who
are ineluctably aware of conceptual change, engaged concept-use requires reasonable
confidence, and in the absence of rational foundations, the possibility of reasonable
confidence is tied to the possibility of critically discriminating between conceptual
practices worth endorsing and those worth rejecting. We show that Left Wittgensteini-
anism offers such a basis for critical discrimination through point-based explanations
of conceptual practices which relate them to the needs of concept-users. We end by
considering how LeftWittgensteinianism guides our understanding of how conceptual
practices can be revised in the face of new needs.
ABSTRACT
1. Introduction
T he concepts that structure our social and political lives pose thechallenge of reconciling engaged concept-use with awareness of concep-
tual change. On the one hand, we are subject to the practical imperative to
deploy at least some of our social and political concepts in an engaged way,
where that means letting our thoughts and actions be guided by the reasons
provided by the application of those concepts—reasons which appear, from
this engaged perspective, to be simply there.1 On the other hand, we are subject
1 See A. W. Moore (2006) and Goldie (2009) for the distinction between engaged and dis-
engaged concept-use. As Williams points out (2006b, p. 195), even if we are aware that
something which is “simply there” for us was not simply there for other people, we do not
have the thought: “for us, it is simply there”—we have the thought: “it is simply there.” That
is what it is for it to be, for us, simply there.
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to the reflective imperative to acknowledge that concepts change from one
culture and epoch to the next, and that this implies that these reasons are only
simply there for us, while different reasons have been simply there for different
people. This sense of alternatives is already on show in Herodotus’s Histories,
but it is inescapable under conditions of modernity.2 We are regularly con-
fronted with alternatives to our ways of going on—not only in history, but
also on our doorstep—which shows that people can live differently because
they have lived and do live differently.
The combination of these two imperatives engenders a familiar anxiety
expressed in the thought that our conceptual practices could be otherwise—not
just in the sense that we might have had different ones, but in the sense that
there is no conclusive argument for preferring the ones we happen to have
over alternatives. How can we be confident in our practices in light of the fact
that they are so pervasively contingent—that, asMill notes inOn Liberty (2003,
p. 101), what made a Churchman in London would have made a Confucian in
Beijing?3 The challenge is to make sense of change in our social and political
concepts in terms that permit full-blooded commitment to at least some of
them—to establish a harmony between engaged concept-use and awareness
of conceptual change.
2 “If it were proposed to all nations to choose which seemed best of all customs,” Herodotus
obverses in his Histories, “each, after examination made, would place its own first; so well is
each persuaded that its own are by far the best.” To prove his point, he recounts how Darius,
king of Persia, summoned the Greeks, who burn their fathers at death, and asked them for
what price they would eat their father’s dead bodies. They retorted that there was no price
for which they would do it. Then Darius summoned the Callatiae, who eat their parents,
and inquired of them for what price they would burn their parents. They “cried aloud, that
he should not speak of so horrid an act.” Herodotus concludes: “it is, I think, rightly said in
Pindar’s poem that use and wont is lord of all” (1920, III 38).
3 This tension between the reflective and the participant’s view of conceptual practices is by
no means restricted to social and political practices. See Kusch (2016) for a discussion of
an analogous tension in epistemic practices. In the epistemic case, however, the extent to
which there is room for a genuinely contrastive “we” is controversial (Seidel, 2014).
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Although the tension between engaged concept-use and awareness of
conceptual change is particularly pronounced in the case of social and political
concepts, social and political philosophy has for the most part shown little
interest in addressing the resulting anxiety. This is no doubt because for
most of its history, it has pursued some form of Foundationalism: the project
of grounding our conceptual practices in rational foundations it sought in
human nature, divine commands, natural law, or universal reason. But given
the growing lack of consensus over whether such foundations are available,
it is increasingly doubtful that these ideas can deliver what is expected of
them. And without foundations, conceptual change once again threatens to
destabilise engaged concept-use.
Once we give up Foundationalism, the main alternative are broadly
Wittgensteinian responses to the challenge that the contingency of our con-
cepts poses to social and political philosophy.4 But since Wittgensteinian
approaches basically defer to existing communal practices, they are standardly
taken to reconcile engaged concept-use with awareness of conceptual change
at the price of encouraging excessive conservatism. Philosophy, Wittgenstein
said, leaves everything as it is.5 This yields a Right Wittgensteinianism that
denies a substantial critical role to social and political philosophy.
In this article, we argue that we cannot rest content with Right Wittgen-
steinianism’s deference to existing communal practices, and that our ability to
reconcile engaged concept-use with awareness of conceptual change is tied to
the very possibility of finding a substantial critical role for social and political
philosophy. Given reflective awareness of conceptual change,mere confidence
4 For further discussion of this methodological divide between Foundationalism andWittgen-
steinianism in social and political philosophy, see B. Williams (2005c) and Plant (1991, p.
330).
5 The conservative influence of Wittgensteinianism in the social and political sphere is noted
by Bloor (1983, 1997, 2000); Norris (2009); Nyi ri (1976, 1982); Plotica (2015); Rorty (1983;
1989, pp. 58-60); Temelini (2015); Hammer (1992); Kekes (1997). See Pleasants (1999, 2002),
Celikates (2015) and Jaeggi (2016) for less conservative readings of Wittgenstein.
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is not enough to sustain engaged concept-use. For us, engaged concept-use
requires reasonable confidence, and this in turn requires the possibility of crit-
ically engaging with and reflectively discriminating between practices that
merit confidence and practices that do not. Taking our cue from Bernard
Williams,6 we argue for a Left Wittgensteinian view of our practices that offers
the possibility of reflective discrimination and reasonable confidence even in
the absence of foundations.
We proceed as follows: in §2, we argue that settling for mere confidence is
unsatisfactory. Pace Right Wittgensteinianism, reconciling engaged concept-
use with awareness of conceptual change requires reasonable confidence in our
conceptual practices, and hence a basis for reflective discrimination between
them. In the absence of foundations that provide such a basis, however, this
seems to imply undiscriminating disengagement from our concepts—the
attitude of the Ironist. In §3, we then show a way out of this bind by arguing
that Ironism still remains wedded to the Foundationalist expectation that we
are looking for the concepts that are absolutely best. Since it is not just concepts
that change, but also the needs of concept-users, what we should seek are the
concepts that are best for us—amore absolute grounding is not necessarily
required. Recognising this brings the possibility of Left Wittgensteinianism
into view. In §4, we show how Left Wittgensteinianism offers a basis for
reflective discrimination through point-based explanations which aim to
relate our conceptual practices to our—often historically inflected and highly
local—needs.7 We end by considering how Left Wittgensteinianism guides
6 See Williams (2005b, 2005c; 2010, 2014a).
7 While there is plenty in Wittgenstein to justify calling a focus on the point of practices
“Wittgensteinian” (see Ertz 2008), a more strictly exegetical treatment of Wittgenstein’s own
views than we undertake here would require a nuanced discussion of the many passages
in which Wittgenstein proves mindful of the fact that it “isn’t clear in all that we do, what
the point is,” and that there might not be a “point in everything we do” (Wittgenstein,
1989, pp. 203–204; 2009a, §§467–470). We take this caveat on board by distancing our
Left Wittgensteinianism from what we term the “Panglossian” view that there is a point
to everything we do. Moreover, these passages voicing suspicions about appeals to points
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our understanding of how conceptual practices can be revised in the face of
new needs.
2. The Need for Reasonable Confidence
Foundationalists resolve the tension between engaged concept-use and aware-
ness of conceptual change by adding a tertium quid: unchanging rational
foundations which mark out one set of conceptual practices as absolutely best.
While different people have of course held different outlooks, most of them
were simply wrong.The Foundationalist is not interested in conceptual change
except as an approximation to the concepts prescribed by unchanging founda-
tions; nor is she committed to the engaged use of the concepts we now have.
The Foundationalist’s concern is with the concepts we should have.
If we let go of the aspiration to find timeless foundations for our con-
cepts, the main methodological alternative consists of broadlyWittgensteinian
approaches. These maintain that the temptation to ground our conceptual
practices in something more basic must be resisted.8 When the chain of rea-
sons comes to an end, we must defer to practice:9 “Once I have exhausted the
justifications, I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am in-
clined to say: ‘This is simply what I do’” (Wittgenstein, 2009a, §217). Beyond
ostensibly serve to alert us to the possibility that particular practices might not have a
point at all, such as “brushing our hair the way we do” (1989, p. 204); they do not question
the general sensibleness of assessing practices according to whether they serve a point:
provided a queer way of calculating the price of wood or of distributing nine sticks among
three people is still sufficiently similar to ours to count as an attempt to perform the same
activity, Wittgenstein remains happy to say that we are “struck by the pointlessness” of some
ways of doing it, because “the whole point of what they are doing seems to be lost” (1989,
pp. 203–204). How the possibility of pointlessness can be accommodated by point-based
explanation is explored in more detail in Cueni and Queloz (forthcoming) and Queloz
(2020, 2021). See also the discussion in §4 below of Wittgenstein’s claim that we sometimes
think in certain terms because it has been found to pay (2005, p. 179; 2009a, §470).
8 See Glock (2009) for an overview of Wittgenstein’s account of concepts.
9 This has been variously called Wittgenstein’s “anti-foundationalism” (M. Williams, 2005) or
“defactoism” (Fogelin, 2009, p. 27).
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this point, it is a mistake to seek reasons for or against going on as we do. The
bedrock of practice is unhintergehbar. We are not argued, but trained into
it through a process of acculturation that exploits and shapes how we find
it natural to go on. There is nothing more basic—in human nature, natural
law, or universal reason—in terms of which our conceptual practices could be
justified. This is true in any area of human thought: whether we are dealing
with empirical or grammatical propositions, with mathematics or morality,
there is bound to be an end to justifications. Following up the chain of rea-
sons in any particular language game, we invariably run into the fact that this
is just how we go on. Reasons peter out.10 A reason that forms a terminus
in one language game may be supportable by further reasons in another lan-
guage game in which the question of why the terminal consideration is as
it is can meaningfully be raised. But in this language game in turn “reasons
will soon give out” (2009a, §211). Insofar as our ways of thinking can be said
to have a foundation at all, that foundation lies not in some indubitable or
self-evident propositions, but in our shared communal practices. In virtue
of their matter-of-factual status, the language games embedded in our prac-
tices are able to play their foundational role as “last court of appeal” (2009a,
§230) when it comes to giving reasons. We have no choice but to “accept the
familiar language game” (1980b, §453).
How doWittgensteinian approaches deal with the challenge of reconcil-
ing engaged concept-use with awareness of conceptual change?The dominant
approach in this group is arguably what Bernard Williams calls Right Wittgen-
steinianism,11 which generalisesWittgenstein’s picture of philosophy as a purely
10 In the 1930s, Wittgenstein gives all kinds of examples for this, including the use of colour
words, the matching of colour samples with objects, and inferences from past to future;
see Wittgenstein (1974, pp. 96–97, 110–111; 2005, p. 292). See also Queloz (2016, 2017) for
exegetical discussions of this theme in Wittgenstein’s middle period (1929–1936).
11 An allusion to the distinction between Left and Right Hegelianism. While Left Hegelians
wanted a society that combined solidarity and tradition with freedom, variety, and the
possibility of radical critique, Right Hegelians were “happier to settle for a more traditional
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descriptive enterprise that must defer to practice (Wittgenstein, 2009a, §§98,
124, 217) to the sphere of the social and political. Right Wittgensteinians insist
that even if we know that other people have different conceptual practices,
it is nevertheless the case that for us, certain considerations just are reasons,
and if we can only steer clear of various confusions, our engaged use should
be immune to awareness of conceptual change. Right Wittgensteinianism
effectively denies that there is a tension between engaged concept-use and
awareness of conceptual change.
This reveals the deeply conservative streak in this type of approach which
renders it difficult to distinguish the confidence it advocates from mere big-
otry.12 We can trace this conservatism to four tendencies inherent in Right
Wittgensteinianism. The first is the tendency to view our form of life holisti-
cally, as a finely calibrated functional whole. This is encouraged by looking
at practices from an anthropological perspective and understanding them
in terms of their function in our lives.13 It invites the Panglossian presump-
tion that every aspect of our form of life has a point for us (as Dr. Panglosse
thought that the bridge of the nose was there to rest glasses on).14 And if this
is so, we have reason to protect our conceptual practices from being tampered
or interfered with, since displacing even only one element in them is likely to
bring diminishment. A second, related source of conservatism is the tendency
to assume that our form of life is tensionless. If our ideas are so coherent that
they can harmoniously be pursued all the way together, there is nothing to en-
courage critique of one part of our form of life in the light of other parts. This
style of consciousness for most citizens, reserving the critical sense of the contingency of
these arrangements to an elite” (B. Williams, 2005c, p. 33).
12 See Bloor (1983, 1997, 2000); Norris (2009); Nyi ri (1976, 1982); Plotica (2015); Rorty (1983;
1989, pp. 58-60); Temelini (2015).
13 SeeHacker (2013) andBrusotti (2014) for concise overviews ofWittgenstein’s anthropological
method.
14 A presumption voiced by Kripke when, urging us to look for the role of utterances in our
lives, he confidently adds that such “a role must exist if this aspect of the language game is
not to be idle” (1982, pp. 73-75).
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assumption of tensionlessness supports the idea that engaged concept-use
can be maintained despite awareness of conceptual change. When combined,
these two tendencies generate a third. On a picture of our conceptual prac-
tices as a tensionless and finely calibrated functional whole, there is nothing to
engender departures from the status quo, and hence nothing that could allow
us to see changes in our practices as endogenous and reason-driven. Insofar as
there is change, it is bound to appear as an imposition from outside the space
of reasons, an exogenous and merely causal matter of brute facticity. This in-
vites thinking of our form of life in static and ahistorical terms. Finally, the
Wittgensteinian idea that it is agreement in practice which bestows meaning
on speech and behaviour tends to render departures from current practice not
just unmotivated, but rationally unintelligible, because any radical departure
from established practice will appear incomprehensible unless it carries with
it a considerable body of agreement—which is to say that radical change will
appear unintelligible unless and until it has already happened. Taken together,
these four tendencies of Right Wittgensteinianism favour the indiscriminate
acceptance of the practices we happen to find—in line with Wittgenstein’s
dictum that philosophy leaves everything as it is.15
But there is a real question to what extent this conservative picture of phi-
losophy reflects Wittgenstein’s subject matter rather than essential features of
his method. In Wittgenstein’s day, the principal subject matter of philosophy
was what P. F. Strawson called the “massive central core of human thinking
which has no history—or none recorded in histories of thought” (1959, p.
10).16 This focus is reflected inWittgenstein’s concern with mathematics, logic,
meaning, understanding, and mind. Most explicitly in the Tractatus, but in
different ways also in later works, Wittgenstein engages with the more un-
15 This picture of Right Wittgensteinianism is meant to correspond to that presented by
Williams (2005c, pp. 34-35; 2006a, pp. 357–358), though he does not distinguish clearly
between what we analyse into four distinct tendencies.
16 See Sluga (1998).
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changing and ineluctable aspects of thought—the concepts that are bound to
play a basic role in anything recognisable as human life. These change, if at
all, comparatively slowly, and alternatives to them are hard to conceive. Even
where Wittgenstein is concerned with differences between cultures, it is to
highlight the necessity of interpreting what is foreign to us by reference to fa-
miliar needs (2009a, §206). It is therefore not surprising that Wittgenstein’s
emphasis should lie on the need to protect and rehabilitate these core ways
of sense-making in the face of local misunderstandings.17 Given this subject
matter, a certain degree of conservatism is arguably a foregone conclusion.
It is by no means clear, however, that a Wittgensteinian approach could
not yield a different,more critical picture of philosophy if applied to social and
political subject matters. For Right Wittgensteinianism, everything—whether
in logic, mathematics, ethics or politics—is equally a matter of how we find it
natural to go on. But is such levelling really true to the thought of one who set
out to teach us differences?18 After all,Wittgenstein himself came to emphasise
that while some parts of our form of life are built on hard rock and practically
exempt from change, others, built on sand, can shift and wash away (1969,
§§99, 65, 165, 256, 336).19
Even if we hold on to the idea that howwe find it natural to go onmust play
a fundamental role in any domain of human thought, there is nevertheless a
glaring asymmetry between the practices that structure anything recognisable
as human life and the practices that shape our social and political lives. It
comes into view as soon as we ask: Who is we? What is the extension of a
given “form of life”? Wittgenstein was not himself driven to ask that question,
17 Which is not to say that amore revisionaryWittgensteinian approachwould be unintelligible
in these areas. See Moore (2012, pp. 275-278) for an illuminating discussion ofWittgenstein’s
conservatism in theoretical philosophy.
18 Wittgenstein considered King Lear’s “I’ll teach you differences!” as a motto for the Philo-
sophical Investigations.
19 For further discussion ofWittgenstein’s emphasis on changes in forms of life, see Christensen
(2011, 2016); Scheman (2011); Schulte (manuscript).
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since for his concerns, the relevant “we” was what Williams calls the inclusive
“we,” a boundless “we” encompassing anybody one could in principle have
a conversation with. The inclusive “we” is one alternatives to which are, if at
all, only dimly conceivable, and in discussing practices like arithmetic, for
example, Wittgenstein indeed makes a point of showing that we do not really
grasp what alternatives to them would involve.
In the social and political sphere, this inclusive “we” is not an option.
Our ethical and political conceptual practices are precisely not those of an
inclusive “we.”They are ours in contrast to those of others. Here the alternatives
to our way of going on are all too vivid, and the “we” in question is therefore
what Williams calls a contrastive “we”: a “we” which implies some contrasting
other, the bounded “we” of us as opposed to them. Where the practices of a
contrastive “we” are concerned, we have precisely what Wittgenstein argued
we are bound to lack with the scaffolding of thought, namely a clear sense of
what alternatives to our own practices involve. The fact that our form of life
betrays its boundedness in the face of alternatives does not by itself change
the fact that our chain of reasons comes to an end, i.e. that the reasons lying
at the bottom of our form of life act as bedrock: how we find it natural to go
on is as much the last the court of appeal in our ethical and political practices
as it is in practices lacking clearly conceivable alternatives.
Such a confrontation with alternative ways of going on can affect our
confidence in our own ways of going on. It fosters a sense that our own form
of life is an outgrowth of history, and in the absence of a theory to the effect
that history must result in a tensionless system in which nothing is idle, this
should in turn render us less inclined to take a Panglossian view of our own
form of life. Why should so much history have produced—of all things—a
perfectly coherent and pared-down functional whole? What one comes to
expect, rather, is a variegated deposit of ideas, each of whichmight have earned
11 • Matthieu Queloz and Damian Cueni
its keep in its own time and place (a notion we shall return to in §4), but where
there is no expectation that they now all work together, or even for us at all.20
An alternative model of our conceptual practices then emerges, on which
our practices are not homogenous and coherent, but heterogenous and full of
intra- and inter-conceptual tensions. Andonce one ismindful of these tensions,
it looks more questionable that Wittgenstein’s conservative conclusions about
the scaffolding of thought are bound to generalise to the social and political
sphere. Confident absorption in such tension-laden practices begins to look
guilty of involving one thought too few.
The root mistake of Right Wittgensteinianism is thus that it neglects
the difference between conceptual practices which can be contrasted with
concrete alternatives and those which cannot. It equates the contrastive and
the inclusive “we”—an equation which, once we think in concrete social terms
about who falls under the relevant “we” and about the political nature of that
question itself, is exposed as untenable in the social and political sphere. Under
reflective scrutiny, the Right Wittgensteinian cannot in the end keep the lid
on the problem of how to reconcile engaged concept-use with awareness of
conceptual change.
This stacks the cards in favour of a different approach within the Wittgen-
steinian family, namely Ironism. The Ironist also rejects Foundationalism, but
while the RightWittgensteinian denies that we need to ground our conceptual
practices in anything more basic in order to be confident in them, the Ironist
holds thatmere confidence is not enough for reflective, pluralistic, and histori-
cally self-conscious modern societies. For such societies, engaged concept-use
requires reasonable confidence.21 And as in the absence of foundations, the
Ironist sees no conclusive argument for preferring the concepts we happen to
have over possible alternatives, the Ironist concludes that engaged concept-use
20 The notion that an idea might earn its keep or have a point for us is ambiguous between
several different senses. For a disambiguation, see Queloz (2019).
21 See Williams (2010) and Fricker (2000).
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is no longer a rational option.22 Instead of the Right Wittgensteinian’s undis-
criminating acceptance, the Ironist opts for undiscriminating disengagement
from her concepts, continuing to live by them in practice, but ceasing fully to
identify with them at a more reflective level.
Arguably, therefore, engaged concept-use is indeed destabilised by aware-
ness of conceptual change, for since engaged use requires reasonable confi-
dence, a lack of foundations leaves us with Ironism. To avoid this conclusion,
we need to show how reasonable confidence in at least some of our practices
can be achieved without foundations. The way forward is provided by a third
form of Wittgensteinianism, which takes the lessons of the Ironist on board
but tries to offer a non-foundationalist basis for reasonable confidence in the
face of conceptual change. This is the position of Left Wittgensteinianism.
3. Beyond Irony: The Possibility of Left Wittgensteinianism
In 1992, Williams introduced a distinction between Left and Right Wittgen-
steinianism which markedly differs from the better-known and superficially
similar distinction that David Bloor proposed in the same year. While Bloor
contrasted a “more historical, social, and materialist-scientific” (1992, p. 281)
interpretation of Wittgenstein with interpretations that are critical of soci-
ological approaches,23 Williams sought to show that as far as critique was
concerned, there was “no reason why non-foundationalist political thought,
characterized in the way that Wittgenstein’s philosophy suggests, should not
22 See Rorty (1989, chs. 3 and 4).
23 Bloor’s distinction is at cross-purposes with Williams’s. Peter Winch’sThe Idea of a Social
Science (1958), for example, is both a prime example of the Wittgenstein-inspired historical,
social, andmaterialist-scientific approach that Bloor calls “LeftWittgensteinian” and a prime
example of the functional holism and hands-off conservatism that Williams calls “Right
Wittgensteinian.”
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take a radical turn.” “There could be,” Williams insisted, “a Left Wittgensteini-
anism” (2005c, p. 37).24
WhenWilliams first introducedhis conception of LeftWittgensteinianism,
Ironism was not among his concerns. But he confronted the Ironist in a later
essay:
[O]nce one goes far enough in recognizing contingency, the problem to
which irony is supposed to provide the answer does not arise at all. . . . Pre-
cisely because we are not unencumbered intelligences selecting in principle
among all possible outlooks, we can accept that this outlook is ours just
because of the history that has made it ours; or, more precisely, has both
made us, and made the outlook as something that is ours. We are no less
contingently formed than the outlook is, and the formation is significantly
the same. We and our outlook are not simply in the same place at the same
time. If we really understand this, deeply understand it, we can be free of
what is indeed another scientistic illusion, that it is our job as rational agents
to search for, or at least move as best we can towards, a system of political
and ethical ideas which would be the best from an absolute point of view, a
point of view that was free of contingent historical perspective. (2006b, pp.
193-194)
On one reading of this response, it is an expression of Right Wittgensteini-
anism. We and our conceptual practices are not just in the same place at the
same time—they are ours, and if only we are identified with them, we shall
be impervious to awareness of contingency. But on this reading, the Ironist
rightly feels short-changed. As John Cottingham articulates the worry: “there
is no real harmony here, just a concatenation of contingencies . . . [t]his is
something we can perhaps learn to put up with. . . ; but confidence seems sadly
out of place” (2009, p. 37).
By contrast, we propose that Williams’s response is best understood as giv-
ing voice to Left Wittgensteinianism—a dynamic view of our conceptual prac-
tices as subject to endogenous, reason-driven change in response to changes
24 Page numbers refer to the reprinted and retitled essay in In the Beginning was the Deed. For
the essay originally published in Common Knowledge as “Left-Wing Wittgenstein, Right-
Wing Marx,” see Williams (1992). It was recently reissued in the same journal under the title
“Left-Wing Wittgenstein” (2019).
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in our needs and purposes.25 The Left Wittgensteinian turns her back on at-
tempts to show that our conceptual practices are absolutely best, and paves
the way for the question whether they are best for us. To hear these as differ-
ent questions is to recognise that it is not only our practices that change, but
also the needs they are meant to satisfy. Even if practices could be shown to be
best for an inclusive “us,” it is unclear that they would be best for a contrastive
“us.” What the Left Wittgensteinian seeks is not an absolutely desirable set of
concepts, but the concepts that are best given needs we can identify with, even
if these needs are local.26
Such a perspective must appear unsatisfactory to the Ironist and the Foun-
dationalist, because they hold a different conception of what would count as
a resource sufficient to sustain engaged concept-use. But this is where they
do not go far enough in recognising contingency. They still see our concepts
as answering to timeless problems that anyone faces. The question raised for
them by conceptual change is whether anyone has reason to prefer the con-
cepts we have over alternatives. And absent such reasons for an inclusive “we,”
confidence in one’s conceptual practices is bound to waver.
But to go far enough in recognising contingency is to accept contingency
also at the level of the problems to which our concepts must answer—what
we need our concepts for, the problems they must help us address, are local
and contingent problems. It is not just the concepts that are ours, but also
the standards they must meet. And if we do not aim for the absolutely best
concepts, the question that conceptual change presses on us is no longer
whether anyone has reason to deploy our concepts, but whether we do, given
our needs and the problems we face.
25 In the 1990 preface that Williams wrote for the French translation of Ethics and the Limits
of Philosophy, he explicitly connects this book to Left Wittgensteinianism; see Williams
(1990).
26 See Wittgenstein (1980a, §643; 2009b, §366).
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Pace Cottingham, there can be harmony here, namely between concepts
and the needs to which they answer. Williams’s remark that “[w]e and our
outlook are not simply in the same place at the same time” and that “the forma-
tion is significantly the same” highlights that the formation of our concepts is
connected to the formation of our needs. Conceptual change is tied to change
in needs, and the needs of a contrastive “we” provide reasons for that “we” to
think in certain terms rather than others and thus yield one kind of basis for
reflective discrimination between our practices.
Recognising this brand of reasons sets LeftWittgensteinianism apart from
the other three positions we considered. The Foundationalist sees the only
possible basis of discrimination as residing in some Archimedean standpoint
outside our practices; the RightWittgensteinian and the Ironist deny that there
is such a basis, but they agree with the Foundationalist in thinking that if a dis-
criminating assessment of our practices were possible, it would have to take a
Foundationalist form: it would have to be given in terms of something exter-
nal to and more basic than that practice itself. In indiscriminately accepting
or rejecting the practices they find, the Right Wittgensteinian and the Ironist
thus betray a counterfactual Foundationalism. They remain committed to the
idea that if we cannot base a discriminating view of our practices on grounds
for “us” in an inclusive sense, then we cannot discriminate at all. Against this,
the Left Wittgensteinian maintains that reasons such as the reasons yielded by
needs that are contingent upon membership of a contrastive “we”—reasons
that are reasons for us, though they are not reasons for anyone—constitute
perfectly good normative resources and allows for discrimination between
practices we can and practices we cannot reasonably be confident in.
The Left Wittgensteinian shift from viewing our practices as answers to
timeless problems to viewing them as answers to local ones is illustrated
by the trajectory of John Rawls’s oeuvre. In his early work, Rawls ostensibly
offered a solution to a timeless problem. To see our place in society from
the perspective of the Original Position “is to see it sub specie aeternitatis:
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it is to regard the human situation not only from all social but also from
all temporal points of view” (1971, p. 587). Political Liberalism, by contrast,
characterises the problem of liberalism as being that of sustaining “a stable
and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable
though incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines” (1993, p.
xviii). The main difference between the earlier and the later Rawls is therefore
what he sees his theory of justice as being a theory for.27 While the earlier
Rawls sees his doctrine of justice as fairness as a solution to a timeless problem,
justifiable to anyone, the later Rawls sees it as a solution to the local problem
of how to arrive at a conception of justice that is justifiable to us now. Any
answer to this problem must reckon with modern societies’ unprecedented
amount of moral diversity and difficulties in reaching substantive agreement.
Instead of uncovering timeless rational foundation, the Original Position
emerges as a model for negotiating the basic structures of society under these
constraints.28 Whether Rawls is right, either about the problem or about its
solution, is debatable.29 But the point is that the late Rawls conceives the task
of political philosophy as being to solve a highly local problem: to develop a
theory of justice for a contrastive “us,” where the relevant “us” is the citizens
of a modern constitutional democracy.
The anxiety triggered by awareness of conceptual change over whether
things could be otherwise is thus missing a crucial parameter: for whom could
they be otherwise? Could they really be otherwise for us, given our needs
and the problems that, however contingently and locally, we actually face? In
many cases, the answer might well be no—our concepts might turn out to
be necessary for us, and thus to merit full-blooded engagement. Moreover,
the contingency of the problems need not detract from the necessity of the
27 See Rawls (1985). See also Williams (2014b, pp. 326-327)
28 See Testini (2020).
29 For one thing, the fact that a radical reinterpretation of the aims of Rawls’s theory leaves the
substantive theory largely unchanged should give us pause; see Williams (2011, pp. 113–116).
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solutions. But this still leaves the question of how we are to tell whether our
conceptual practices are right or even necessary for us.
4. Achieving Reasonable Confidence: A Left Wittgensteinian Account
As we propose to understand it, Left Wittgensteinianism is principally charac-
terised by two features: it works under the assumption that our conceptual
practices are a tension-laden assemblage of makeshift measures rather than a
harmoniously functional whole; and it uses what we shall call point-based ex-
planations of our conceptual practices to reveal their point given our needs.
We shall look at each in turn before addressing objections and adding refine-
ments.
We saw in §2 how Right Wittgensteinianism is characterised by a fourfold
tendency (i) to view our form of life as a finely calibrated functional whole; (ii)
to assume that it is tensionless; (iii) to think of it in static and ahistorical terms;
and (iv) to view departures from current practice not just as unmotivated,
but as rationally unintelligible unless and until they have already happened.
The Left Wittgensteinian view of our conceptual practices reverses all four
tendencies. It invites us to approach our practices not as a satisfactorily func-
tioning whole, but as a motley structure which forms the historical outgrowth
of a multitude of competing needs, and is accordingly full of tensions. This in
turn invites us to view our conceptual practices as a dynamic structure that
changes over time, and to make sense of that change as endogenous and at
least partly reason-driven rather than as a brute causal fact.
These Right and the Left Wittgensteinian pictures of our conceptual prac-
tices should be thought of not so much as competing findings that might issue
from thorough investigations of what our practices are actually like—though
reflection on the tumultuous history from which our practices emerged might
be expected to encourage the LeftWittgensteinian picture—but rather aswork-
ing models of the phenomena that one consciously or unconsciously adopts
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even before starting the investigation of one’s practices; for better or worse,
such working models can guide one’s investigations, prime one’s expectations,
and shape one’s sense of saliency.
Exchanging the Right for the Left Wittgensteinian model prompts one to
approach one’s conceptual practices as a tension-laden bricolage of concepts
that earned their keep, if at all, individually, and to look for the tensions between
these concepts. Such tensions can take various forms. There can be a tension
when we hold commitments to different values that pull in different directions
in the sense that they cannot be maximally co-instantiated, for example.30
Or there may be an inherent tension between two concepts from the start:
liberalism, understood as the idea that there are some inalienable rights that
people have, stands in a deep tension with democracy, understood as the idea
that all laws are made by the people. If there are some things that public power
may not do to people, but all public power rests with the people, what do we
do when the people want to do things that public powermay not do to people?
(Despite theoretical attempts at a solution, public institutions do not actually
dissolve this tension, but merely try to accommodate it in practice.)31
Our model of our conceptual practices becomes more dynamic once our
conceptual practices are seen as a tension-laden bricolage of concepts. It
may still be the case that each concept has earned its keep under particular
circumstances, but there is no longer any expectation that our concepts now
all harmoniously function together. And in virtue of the tensions between
our concepts, extrapolations of some parts of our conceptual practices can
stand condemned in light of extrapolations of other parts. These tensions
begin to render intelligible how there can be rationally motivated movement
in our conceptual practices by showing how our practices include practices of
critique.
30 See Geuss (2001, p. 156) and Williams (1981).
31 For an attempt at a theoretical solution, see Habermas (1996). For the claim that institutions
only accommodate this tension, see Möllers (2013).
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However, the possibility of turning mere confidence into reasonable confi-
dence depends on there being more than just the possibility of criticising one
set of concepts in the light of another. It depends on there being some basis
for reflective discrimination between conceptual practices worth endorsing
and conceptual practices worth rejecting. It is here that the second princi-
pal feature of Left Wittgensteinianism comes in. Left Wittgensteinianism
offers us a basis for reflective discrimination through point-based explana-
tions of our practices which reveal their point given our needs. In the face of
conceptual change, the Left Wittgensteinian can put her confidence in her
conceptual practices to the test by asking:Whence the bedrock that turns back
the spade of reflection? Can we explain why our conceptual practices are as
they are by relating them to something explanatorily prior, such as the needs
of concept-users and the problems they face? Can we achieve a better grip
on our practices by coming to an explicit understanding of their point given
these facts about concept-users?
The importance of grasping the point of conceptual practices is something
that Wittgenstein places great emphasis on in his later work:
Ause of language has normally what wemight call a point.This is immensely
important. Although it’s true this is a matter of degree, and we can’t say just
where it ends. (1989, p. 205).
One of the methodological lessons to be drawn fromWittgenstein’s later work
is that facts about our conceptual practices must be understood in the light of
facts which, while conceptually articulated, are not facts about our conceptual
practices, because how we go on and what concepts have a point for us is
contingent upon certain root facts about us and our needs in the kind of world
we live in.32 Conversely, certain conceptual practices are rendered pointless
by the fact that we or the world in which we could deploy them lack any
feature that would give them an application. “It is not every sentence-like
32 See Ertz (2008).
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formulation that we know how to do something with, not every technique
has an application in our life” (Wittgenstein 2009a, §520).
Although the practical needs arising from facts about us and our situation
may directly yield reasons to think or do something in certain cases, this
is the exception; for the most part, needs do not function as criteria—they
do not enter into our deliberations as premises in practical syllogisms. We
should therefore resist the voluntaristic picture on which we can choose, on
the basis of what we need, which concepts and justifications make sense to
us.33 The relation between our needs and the pull of particular action-guiding
considerations is typically not a direct one.
Nevertheless, we can identify a less direct path by which reflection on why
we go in for a conceptual practice can feed into deliberation. This path comes
into view once we see the relations between four strata within our conceptual
practices:
(a) needs;
(b) reasons for concept use;
(c) reasons for concept application;
(d) reasons to draw certain consequences in thought and action.
Let us say that reasons for concept application are the reasons that guide and
flow from the application of concepts, while reasons for concept use are the
rationales that underlie the formation and adoption of concepts—the facts
about the kinds of creatures we are and the kinds of environments we live in
that render certain concepts worth having.34 Needs connect to deliberation
via reasons for concept use: needs yield reasons for concept use, concept use
33 See Wittgenstein (1969, §317).
34 These reasons for concept use need not be anything very rationalistic, but may on the
contrary reside in what Wittgenstein often calls the “primitive” or “animal” basis of our
language.
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yields reasons for concept application, and concept application yields reasons
to draw certain consequences in deliberation.
This stratified view of our conceptual practices allows us to offer point-
based explanations indicating whether we have reason to use a concept in a
confident and engaged way. Exploiting the connections between (a) – (d), we
can try to determine what the point of a given conceptual practice is, whether
it has a point for us, and whether it derives this point from needs we endorse.
We can do this by trying to identify the root conditions which together gener-
ate a problem to which the practice constitutes a solution. We thereby show
the practice to be contingent upon these roots facts; but we also show it to
be practically necessary given these facts if the challenge they give rise to ex-
erts a strong pragmatic pressure on the remedying practice to arise. We will
have reason to use a given concept, and hence to make certain features of the
world salient and to be guided by the reasons for action associated therewith,
if making these features salient and having these reasons for actions is instru-
mentally related to the satisfaction of needs we identify with. “Sometimes,”
as Wittgenstein notes, one thinks in certain terms “because it has proved its
worth” (2005, p. 179; see also 2009a, §470).35 But as Wittgenstein’s emphasis
intimates, a practice may also turn out to be pointless or even dysfunctional for
us.36 There is a real question about whether and how a given way of thinking
proves its worth, and whether it does so for us. The conditions under which
the concepts have a point may no longer obtain, or, as critics of ideology re-
35 See Glock (1996, p. 47) for an overview of passages expressing Wittgenstein’s misgivings
about justifying the rules of grammar in terms of their point. Schulte (manuscript) offers a
balanced assessment of these countervailing tendencies inWittgenstein’s work that ultimately
leaves ample room for Left Wittgensteinianism.
36 There is a further distinction, which need not concern us here, between two senses of
pointless: a practice can be pointless in the sense that it fails, in the particular way in which it
is executed, to serve a clearly articulable point which, given the kind of practice it is, it ought
to be serving (an eccentric way of calculating the price of wood for sale may fail to serve the
point it ought to be serving granted that it is in that business at all; see Wittgenstein 1989,
203–204). But a practice can also lack a clearly articulable point altogether, without being a
poor example of its kind.
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mind us, our concepts may benefit a group that we are not part of.37 Either
way, the Left Wittgensteinian can add to the Right Wittgensteinian’s “This is
just how we go on”—either by showing that we rightly go on as we do because
it serves a point given needs we want to see satisfied; or that we wrongly go on
as we do because it is pointless or it serves needs we either do not share or do
not want to see satisfied.
Take our practice of blame, which may serve as an illustrative example of
how point-based explanations can provide us with reasonable confidence.38
Many have seen their confidence in our practice of blame waver upon reflec-
tion.39 This, to be sure, is in part the result of metaphysical worries about
freedom of the will, concerns that Wittgensteinians are apt to dismiss as arte-
facts of discussions in the seminar room. Yet blame is an interesting case in
part because it offers a good example of metaphysical worries that are widely
shared beyond the seminar room. The rise of neuroscience may have exacer-
bated these worries, but they have long held sway both in popular culture and
in legal thought about punishment. Quite apart from worries of a metaphysi-
cal sort, however, our confidence in blame may waver under the pressure we
started out with, of confrontation with other cultures—such as the shame so-
cieties of the ancient world—in which blame appears to have played a smaller
role.40 And our confidence in blame may fade for various other familiar and
quite ordinary reasons: people often think blame too redolent of moralism,
or feel it to be inappropriate in light of what they know about the causal deter-
minants of an action, or perceive it as a lowly expression of resentment that
ought to be outgrown, or consider it a form of violence because it “entails a
wounding judgement, hard feelings, a punitive reaction, or some combination
of these” (Owens, 2012, p. 25). Should we remain confident in our practice of
37 See Hartsock (1998).
38 The example is adapted from Fricker (2016).
39 See Fricker (2016, §1) and Tognazzini and Coates (2018) for overviews of such worries.
40 See Williams (1993).
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blame in the face of these worries? Can the mere confidence of the unreflec-
tive person be turned into reasonable confidence through reflections of a Left
Wittgensteinian stripe?
The basic strategy of a point-based explanation of blame is to eschew
attempts to anchor our practice of blame in a metaphysical account of blame-
worthiness and to seek instead to explain why we treat people as blameworthy
in terms of the point of blaming given our needs: what does blaming do for us?
Why would creatures like us go in for it? A rich illustration of what an answer
to these questions might look like has recently been provided by Miranda
Fricker (2016, forthcoming). Using a paradigmatic instance of the practice of
blame as our model (much as Wittgenstein uses simplified language games
as objects of comparison by which to elucidate features of our complex lin-
guistic practices), we can hypothesise what the explanatorily basic point or
function of blame is, and which needs it serves.41 Following Fricker, we might
take what she calls Communicative Blame as our basic model: A wrongs B
and B reciprocates with the emotionally charged judgement that A is at fault.
In blaming A, B aims to make A sorry for what A has done—B tries to elicit
remorse. By blaming A, however, B is likely to bring about increased align-
ment between A’s and B’s moral commitments.42 On this account, the point
41 “Our clear and simple language-games are not preliminary studies for a future regimen-
tation of language—as it were, first approximations, ignoring friction and air resistance.
Rather, the language-games stand there as objects of comparison which, through similari-
ties and dissimilarities, are meant to throw light on features of our language” (Wittgenstein,
2009a, §130). A similar idea is advanced by Friedrich Waismann under the heading of a
“grammatical model” (1977, p. 50).
42 Fricker’s paradigm case of Communicative Blame will sound fairly intellectualist to Wittgen-
steinian ears. But a paradigm case is an instance of our actual practice that is useful for
expository purposes because it renders its point particularly salient. It differs from what
Wittgenstein calls the “primitive” or “animal” basis of a practice, which, presumably, we
would not seek in Communicative Blame, but (to take an example suggested by a reviewer)
in something like the way the dog will growl or nip at a puppy that bites too hard. The prim-
itive basis and the paradigm case of a practice may both be of help in revealing the practice’s
overarching point, but they will serve us in slightly different ways. See Queloz (2020; 2021,
ch. 3) for a discussion of when each is called for.
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of blame is to induce the admixture of moral feeling and judgement that is
remorse with a view to achieving an increased alignment of moral commit-
ments. This yields both an explanation and a rationalisation of blame—an
account of why there came to be the practice of blaming and a reason why we
might want to continue the practice. Blame, on this view, is a tool of social
control that performs a valuable service in helping us inhabit a shared moral
world.
For our purposes, the key upshot of such a point-based explanation of
blame is that it gives us a basis for reflective discrimination: it puts us in a
position not only to evaluate whether the practice of blame deserves confident
engagement at all, but also to evaluate which forms of blame do so. Through a
point-based explanation of blame, we come to see which forms of the practice
are pointful and which are pointless. We might also find that the point itself
is problematic because the needs served are needs we do not want to see
fulfilled. Not all point-based explanations will support our confidence in our
conceptual practices. But in the case of blame, the point-based explanation
is in the first instance vindicatory: it shows us that there are circumstances
under which blame serves certain needs, and that these are needs we can
endorse upon critical examination.
A point-based explanation of blame can thus strengthen our confidence
even in the face of confrontations with cultures that are less prone to engage in
blame, because it gives us some reason to think thatwe, in the contrastive sense,
especially need blame. If blame is a tool for moral alignment, it follows that
the more morally diverse societies are, the more there is a need for blame.43
In societies that are relatively morally homogenous or that do not shy away
from using force to secure alignment in behaviour, there is less of a role for
blame to play. In morally heterogenous societies that largely try to eschew
alignment through force, however, there is a greater need for the technique of
43 Here we go beyond Fricker’s account. See also Queloz (forthcoming) for a development of
this line of thought.
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moral alignment that is blame. And since our society is of the latter sort, it
follows that we have a particularly pronounced need for something along the
lines of blame.
By delineating the proper remit of blame, the point-based explanation
also indicates when blame overreaches itself. Most obviously, blame becomes
pointless or worse once moral alignment has been secured. But it also be-
comes pointless in situations where no moral alignment is to be had anyway,
either because the addressee is unreceptive to blame, or because the action
was out of character—a mere slip that was not expressive of the person’s moral
commitments in the first place.44 This provides further grounding for reason-
able confidence in our practice of blame: by becoming aware of the relation
of blame to our needs, we gain a critical awareness of when blaming is called
for and when it is out of place, and this in turn means that we can blame
more confidently where we have reflectively assured ourselves that it serves a
point. As a result of this point-based explanation, then, mere confidence in
our practice of blaming is transformed into reasonable confidence, grounded
both in the knowledge that in many cases, blame has a point for us and serves
needs we want to see satisfied, and in a critical sense of the conditions un-
der which blame oversteps its proper remit. The lesson of this example is that
point-based explanations can give us a basis for reflective discrimination be-
tween (forms of) conceptual practices which merit our confidence and (forms
of) conceptual practices which do not.
Another example of a point-based explanation that is meant to ground
reasonable confidence is Bernard Williams’s (2002) explanation of truthful-
ness, which derives the need to value truthfulness intrinsically from more
primitive generic and local needs. In the course of his explanation, Williams
highlights increasingly local needs. He begins with the reasons that any com-
munity of creatures with a need to pool information has to cultivate good—i.e.
44 Fricker (2016, §1) offers further examples of these “pathologies of blame,” as she calls them.
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truthful—contributors to the pool, and ends with reasons for a more local
“us” to cultivate truthfulness—that liberal societies specially need to cultivate
truthfulness about history, because what animates liberalism is largely the
awareness of past atrocities (2002, pp. 265–266). By revealing the point of
truthfulness for us, the explanation yields reasons for us to continue to cul-
tivate it and vindicates our confidence in it.45 Crucially, this is not to justify
individual considerations acting as reasons for individual acts or beliefs. It is to
justify the disposition to accept certain considerations as reasons, even if it can-
not justify the considerations themselves. Moreover, showing how a concept
is connected to one’s needs cannot blast one into internalising the concept and
recognising the reasons it provides. Any consideration advanced as a reason
still has to make sense from the inside, deliberative perspective, and whether
it does will depend on what other conceptual practices it is embedded in, and
whether it engages our emotional capacities.46 But the explanatory perspec-
tive shows that itmakes sense that it should make sense to us from the inside
in this way. It shows us why we have reason to treat given considerations as
reasons.
A point-based explanation can also reveal that a conceptual practice fails
to merit our confidence. A point-based explanation of the concept chastity, for
example, might reveal it to serve needs, but ones we do not share. As Michael
Smith argues, it is primarily those who feel the need to restrain women’s sexual
behaviour (2013, pp. 103–104) who have reason to use the concept chastity. To
the extent that this is indeed what the concept does, and that we no longer
share the need to restrain women in this way, we will have no reason to use
45 Other examples include Williams’s own explanation of the point of the value of liberty
(2005a) and Miranda Fricker’s explanation of the point of testimonial justice (2007) and of
forgiveness (forthcoming).
46 See Williams (2002, pp. 91-92).
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the concept of chastity and will be vindicated in moving away from thinking
in these terms.47
But as this example also indicates, it is not just a matter of sharing or
failing to share the needs in question; sometimes, the needs themselves are
problematic, even when or just because they are shared. By bringing the
needs served by conceptual practices into reflective awareness, point-based
explanation allows them to be subjected to critical scrutiny. The victims of
pernicious ideologies who reflect on the point of such conceptual practices will
come to recognise that if these serve any real needs, it is at their own expense:
the needs in question are someone else’s, they are being satisfied at the expense
of the victims, and the victims’ confidence in these conceptual practices will
consequently be undermined. But even when the needs in question are ones
which the addressees of a point-based explanation share, needs can be assessed
in the light of the rest of our commitments. We do not just assess the aptness of
our conceptual practices in the light of our needs (Is this a good tool given our
needs?), but also the legitimacy of our needs in the light of our concepts (Are
these really needs? And if so, are they needs we should be trying to satisfy?).
A need may seem pressing when considered in isolation, but not that pressing
all things considered; or it may turn out not to be a real need at all. How we
ascribe and assess individual needs and concepts will depend on our outlook,
but from within such an outlook, whether or not we have certain needs will
largely be an objective matter. Insofar as the ancient Greeks thought of slavery
as something necessary, they were probably simply wrong—something which,
as Bernard Williams has argued (1993, pp. 106–118), most Greeks (apart from
Aristotle) in fact recognised. They may have had a need for cheap labour, but
they were wrong to think that slavery was either the only or the best way of
satisfying this need. Calling something a need does not make it one. Nor can
47 Although with a concept whose history is as long and complex as that of the concept of
chastity, to leave it at that is no doubt an oversimplification, as there may be more subtle
functions discharged by the concept; but it will do as an illustration of the general point.
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we simply decide to need something. If the upshot of a point-based explanation
is that we find ourselves arguing over whether something really is a need or
not, or whether a need really renders certain practices inevitable and could
not be satisfied by other means, this is a welcome result, because this is the
discussion we need to have.
Once a point-based explanation has brought the needs to which a concep-
tual practice answers out into the open, we can question the necessity of the
conceptual practice by problematising the needs to which it answers: are these
real needs, and are they needs we should reflectively endorse? One familiar
and radical example of someone who problematises needs is KarlMarx. InThe
German Ideology (2000), Marx argues that it is pointless to argue within the
framework of liberal rights about how to resolve problems of justice, because
all those concepts respond to what he deems the “false” needs of bourgeois
society. This is to problematise the problems to which bourgeois conceptual
practices answer—on the supposition that there is a possible alternative for us,
that the Marxist utopia need not remain utopian. Needs being what they are,
however, there are also limits to how far we can go in problematising needs.
Against the anarchist, for example,Williams maintains that we have an inelim-
inable need for the state. He highlights that our needs inevitably include the
needs to secure “order, protection, safety, trust, and the conditions of coopera-
tion.”48 These needs constrain what is possible for us now, and on Williams’s
reckoning, they exclude the possibility of political anarchism.49
Finally, let us refine our account of Left Wittgensteinianism in response
to natural objections. One such objection is the following: According to Left
Wittgensteinianism, facts about our conceptual practices must be understood
in the light of facts that are not facts about our conceptual practices, because
how we go on and what concepts have a point for us is contingent upon
48 See B. Williams (2005d, p. 3).
49 What it does not exclude is philosophical anarchism, the position that the state is bound to
be illegitimate, but that there is no real alternative to it in practice.
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certain root facts about us and our needs in the kind of world we live in. But
needs have to be conceptually articulated in order to enter into reflection,
and therefore they are not really external to our conceptual practices. This
objection is easily answered. The Left Wittgensteinian does not propose to
understand all of our conceptual practices at once in the light of facts that are
completely independent of these conceptual practices. Rather, the idea is to
operate piece-meal, explaining one concept while relying on the rest of our
conceptual resources. Moreover, the fact that some needs only come into view
given that one has certain conceptual capacities is no bar to seeing needs as
external to our conceptual practices—just as the fact that one only recognises
Australian shepherds as such given that one has the concept thereof does
not turn dogs into concepts. We are not asking—incoherently—for reasons
that are external to all our conceptual practices in the sense that they do
not draw on our conceptual resources. We are asking why we treat certain
considerations—of human rights, for instance—as being simply there, neither
capable nor in need of further justification, and this questionmay be answered
in terms of anthropology, history, and psychology. When concepts change
and new considerations come to be treated as reasons, one explanation is that
the new concepts and reasons better suit the needs of the people involved. For
this to be true, the needs need not figure in the thought processes of these
people. Needs can shape the space of reasons the way eyes shape the field
of vision. But we understand our concepts better if we have a perspicuous
representation of their relation to our needs.
A second natural objection is that Left Wittgensteinianism merely ex-
changes foundations in human nature, natural law, or universal reason for
foundations in unchanging needs. But this is a misunderstanding. To begin
with, even where needs are primary in the order of explanation, this does
not imply that they are also primary in the order of justification. Needs can
give rise to concepts whose application yields reasons that carrymore author-
ity than the practical demands that brought them into being. The need to be
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able to rely on others can help us understand the emergence of the concept of
loyalty, for example, as a means of stabilising cooperation in the face of temp-
tations to defect. But it is part of the point of the concept of loyalty that once
one comes to use it in an engaged way, loyalty no longer appears as a mere
means to an end, but raises demands of its own: the consideration that loy-
alty is a means of stabilising cooperative behaviour may well carry less weight
than the consideration that this is the kind of action it is. Viewing concepts
as tools need not imply a reductive form of instrumentalism which collapses
the content of concepts into a functional understanding of those concepts. It
can be an explanatory instrumentalism, explaining why we use concepts with
certain boundaries by identifying the point of having a concept with these
boundaries and the needs that are satisfied thereby.
More generally, however, the objection misses the mark because the layer
of needs must not be thought of as unchanging. To treat needs as unalterable
and fixed by nature is to see our conceptual practices as serving only to satisfy
antecedently specifiable needs. This ahistorical view focuses on the needs we
have anyway to the exclusion of needs we acquired or lost in the course of
history. But of course, one thing that conceptual practices enable us to do is
to create new needs. As Rorty puts it:
TheWittgensteinian analogy between vocabularies and tools has one ob-
vious drawback. The craftsman typically knows what job he needs to do
before picking or inventing tools with which to do it. By contrast, someone
like Galileo, Yeats, or Hegel . . . is typically unable to make clear exactly what
he wants to do before developing the language in which he succeeds in do-
ing it. His new vocabulary makes possible, for the first time, a formulation
of its own purpose.50
Needs can be local needs, specific to a certain cultural group thinking in terms
of certain concepts because these concepts are constitutive of these needs. In
this sense, what we now need our concepts to be is a function of our history.
50 See Rorty (1989, pp. 12-13); see also Brandom (2000, p. 363; 2011).
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There is no reason why conceptually constituted local needs should not also
contribute to understanding why our conceptual practices are as they are.
To view all our conceptual practices as tools helping us cope with needs we
have anyway is to fall into the kind of reductive naturalism which assumes,
as Robert Brandom puts it, that we could safely dismiss Romantic poetry by
asking what contribution it has ever made to the biological fitness of human
beings (2011, p. 140). Some concepts are tools responding to needs we would
not have without them.
To urge that needs are subject to change is to concede that they are them-
selves not immune to the thought that they could be otherwise. This gives
rise to a third objection that ought to be addressed. So far, our argument has
focused on holding in check the idea that our conceptual practices could
be otherwise by grounding them in our needs. But now it appears that con-
tingency seeps through to our needs. Is not our entire attempt to reconcile
engaged concept-use with conceptual change put into jeopardy by the realisa-
tion that needs change as well?
Far from putting LeftWittgensteinianism into jeopardy, the fact that needs
change yields a strong argument in its support. Changing needs create a
problem for views such as the RightWittgensteinian’s, onwhichour conceptual
practices are a tension-free and satisfactorily functioning but rigidwhole. If we
had tensionless concepts, trimmed and tailored to extant needs, we would be at
a loss to explain how we ever manage to adjust our conceptual practices in the
face of new needs. A change in our needs would trigger crises of confidence
we would be hard-pressed to deal with. If our concepts are repositories of
diverse historically accumulated material full of intra- and interconceptual
tensions, by contrast, we are better equipped to deal with changes in needs:
it is precisely these tensions which enable us to adjust to change. The Left
Wittgensteinian model of our practices can make sense of the fact that we are
able to cope with new needs. Tension-laden practices are more resilient than
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tension-free ones. They have all the advantages of flexible plywood over rigid
but breakable hardwood.
To make sense of the dynamic development of our conceptual practices,
however, it is not enough to make sense of it solely from a perspective that
looks at needs and reasons to use certain concepts. We also need tomake sense
of the fact that itmakes sense to those who participate in the change. Realising
that we face a new need and require new conceptual resources to deal with
it can only get us as far as the conclusion that we have reason to use certain
concepts and to treat certain considerations as reasons. But it is a further
step to be able actually to make sense of these considerations as genuine
reasons for us. To do this, we inevitably depend on the conceptual resources
we already have. The relevant question then is one that John Dunn raises in
Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future—whether our traditions of
political thought “possess any real residual capacity to direct us in the face of
the world that now confronts us” (1993, p. ix). And now we see that conceptual
practices that include a variegated array of historically accumulated and partly
idle material are better equipped than more streamlined ones to provide the
resources for an endogenous, reason-driven shift into a view of things from
which the new needs can be addressed.
Consider the problems of legitimation we face in dealing with new forms
of international rule.51 We are subject to two conflicting needs. On the one
hand, we need strengthened international institutions to tackle the pressing
political problems of the day—climate change, financial systemic risk or the
global migration crisis. On the other hand, we also need any new form of
rule to be distinguishable from mere coercion in order to be legitimate. But
the legitimating concepts we have inherited are tailored to forms of rule
within the nation-state and fail to get enough of a grip on institutions beyond
the nation-state. As a result, we struggle to make sense even of how these
51 For a more detailed discussion, see Cueni (2020).
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new international forms of rule could be legitimate. Given that public power
beyond the state looks very different from the form it took within the state,
what would it even mean for concepts like democracy, the rule of law, and
the separation of powers to apply in this context? This leads to the problem,
which is particularly pressing for the people of liberal democratic states, of
how to reconcile the need for strengthened international institutions with the
demand for legitimacy.
In order to escape the resulting dilemma, we need to find some kind of cre-
ative extension of our old legitimating concepts to new forms of international
rule. And here a Left Wittgensteinian approach provides both normative guid-
ance and reason for optimism. Point-based explanations of why we have the
legitimating concepts we have within the state in the first place can show us
what their point is under typical domestic circumstances. This can then guide
us in identifying similarly pointful concepts in thinking about new forms of
rule beyond the state—which will not necessarily be the same concepts as
those we have within the domestic context. The Left Wittgensteinian model of
our conceptual practices provides reason for optimism, meanwhile, because
on that model, we can draw on a far richer set of conceptual resources with
which to tackle such new needs than the Right Wittgensteinian model would
have led us to expect. For example, a much more nuanced understanding of
liberal democratic constitutionalism than the one that figures in our domi-
nant legitimation stories may lead us to question the excessive emphasis on
national self-determination in the face of challenges that we clearly cannot
address on our own.
On a similar note, another timely example of this last point is our relatively
new need to solve the global environmental problems generated by climate
change. Faced with this new need and what it demands of us, we might come
to the conclusion that we need certain new conceptual practices that enable
us to cope with environmental problems. Dale Jamieson has argued that we
need to cultivate what he calls “green virtues” (2007):
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when faced with global environmental problems such as climate change,
our general policy should be to try to reduce our contribution regardless of
the behaviour of others, and we are more likely to succeed in doing this and
living worthwhile lives by developing and inculcating the right virtues than
by improving our calculative abilities. (Jamieson, 2014, p. 186)
By itself, this insight only takes us from new needs to new reasons for concept-
use. In order for these concepts to make sense to us, and to enable us to
rationalise new actions, we depend on the conceptual resources we bring to
the table. And here a set of concepts that has largely remained idle in recent
history, that of the virtues, can help. It will not be enough simply to revive
the old idea of virtues, since these answered to problems other than those we
now face. But the richer and more heterogenous our conceptual practices are,
the easier we will find it to combine aspects of one set of ideas with aspects of
another in order to create novel solutions. Jamieson, for example, advocates a
new virtue of mindfulness as the disposition to appreciate the consequences
of one’s actions even when they are remote in time and space (2007, p. 182).
As this brings out, the Left Wittgensteinian model of our conceptual practices
is no mere second-best for which we must settle when tensionless harmony
proves hard to achieve. The motley of our concepts cannot be too rich.
5. Conclusion
In this article, we have been arguing that for us, who are ineluctably aware of
conceptual change, the possibility of engaged concept-use is tied to the possi-
bility of reasonable confidence, and that in the absence of foundations, the
possibility of reasonable confidence is in turn tied to the possibility of a Left
Wittgensteinian view of our conceptual practices which allows for reflective
discrimination between practices that merit confidence and practices that do
not. We have further argued that there can in fact be a Left Wittgensteinian-
ism. If this is right, it implies that we can sustain engaged concept-use in the
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face of conceptual change, and that there is a substantial role for social and po-
litical philosophy to play even on a Wittgensteinian view of things. These two
implications are linked in more ways than one. Social and political philoso-
phy can, on the one hand, help us sustain engaged concept-use by scrutinising
and critically assessing the concepts we already have. But precisely because
needs change, and continue to do so, we cannot rest content with engaged use
of the concepts we already have. New needs will arise, and this gives social
and political philosophy a further substantial part to play, not just in criticis-
ing the concepts we already have, but in devising new conceptual resources
in the face of new problems. Reasonable confidence continuously needs to be
achieved anew.52
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